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ISRAELI VALUES,
ISRAELI CONTROL
NATHAN TORONTO

Piilestilli{lIls lil'iIZ!!' ill I.rrae!:r o[(JfPied territories do /lot tlljo)' tbe sallie pO/itim/, cilJil, or IllIlJlan I~~hts {/J their Lrraeli
1lf{!!,/JI}OIJ. IsmI'D de.rire to (rMte (/ jm'isb, deIJlomili[ state ill tbeir birtonc /Jomelalld Ila.r led tJ.lem to I'io/ate tIle ba.ri[
r{!!,hts of l/ol/~lf}}i.r/, illb,,/;ifallt.r.

Tbe .roldifl; lIollcJ.lalallti), and witl, a distillrl air 0/
rollti!le, Pllt Ollt a balld to stop tbe Mil IN ]J'ere in. He
opmed tIle slidil{~ door (lIId said mrli)', "PaHports." I
mllid tell bi.r l:/{l!.lisb J1'aJ lIotbilZI!. to /m{!!, a/JOllt /mll//Je
he didn't lIJe a t'Ulllplde sentellce and bi.r pronllnciation
]J'm [are/eH. ;\Jitpi,kine.rJ mide. I decided t/.wt I }}'aJ nol
RoilZ!!' to bllmor Ili.r reCjm,r/. I opflled tbe paill/.r O/III}'
iWlldr ill c\'a,rperatioll, slm(l!.l!,ed III), sllOlIlder.r, and .laid
m{lttfl'~oH;'dly, "Rllt I 'III all "ll11enmll. " He pallJed He
Iwd IIIlderJtood ]J'bal I'd;lt.rt .raid. 11"bell I'd realized
]J.Ji{/1 ] 'd J'aid, it ]J't/.r a/I] coll/d do to keep from lal(l!,bil{i!,
ill I)i.r}lce. He did a bal/ tum {/}}'{l),/rolll IIff, still
.rpeecb!e.rs. and tbell tllrned back arollnd, /JlllllIblilZI!.
.romet/.lil{i!,. He lI'a.r abollt 10 "'WI'er IIH }]'/JeJl bi.r .wpen·or
approac/.lf(/, pllJbed Ililll (/}}'{/)', (lIld Ibm Jlalllllled tbe door
slllIt. IlJllllediate/f', ollr dril'er .rpf(/ oil.' 1.r IN ItlI{i!,/Jed
lleartil), abou! wl)at badjllJt l}(lppened, if also oCClirred to
lIIe tli{/t if I bad befll P{ile.rtillian, perbap.r Illy .fIlott)'
remark JI'olild ha/'e elicited t/ ,'ery dijjermt re.rjJoflJe.
-Author', Journal, May 3, 1999

eing an American gave me special privileges
that night. Essentially, I was asking to be ex~
empt from the rules, to be treated differently than
people normally are. While living in Jerusalem, I
often heard stories of the Israeli Defense Forces
(IDf7) detaining, questioning, and even beating
Palestinians who defied their orders, I was being
defiant as well, but I sensed, at the same time, that
I was above the rules for Palestinians because I was
a non~Arab and an American. There is a dual value
system-implicitly understood in lsrael-dictating
that Palestinians should not receive the same treat~
ment that others do. There are different rules for
Palestinians than there are for Israelis. Fortunately
for me, the rules that apply to Israelis also apply
to Americans.
\,\'hen Israel occupied the West Bank and
Gaza in June 1967, it became apparent that Israel
would not view Palestinian Arabs and Jews in the
same light. At the time, Joseph Weitz, a prominent
Zionist leader, emphasized "the need to sustain
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the character of the state which will henceforth be
Jewish, and ob\'iously in the near future, b\' the
majority of its inhabitants, with a non-Jewish
minorit\' limited to 15 percenL'" j\ member of the
I,-nesset (1\\1'-), Shulamit Aloni, blasted this \'iew
as a double standard when arguing against the text
of the 1980 foundation of Legislation La\\', which
indirectly allowed the courts to discriminate against
non-Jews:
This Idiscrimination] is the reason for the
objection to add to the proposed law the principles of the Declaration of Independence. This
is the reason wh\, the text of the law does not
include the phrase ... "principles of freedom,
justice, honest\' and peace \vithout discrimination for reasons of origin, race, nationalit\',
religion or sex." Such non-discrimination stands
contrary tn the "heritage of Israel" as it is
interpreted today in the state of I sraei.'
The dual value s\'Stem underlying Israeli snciet\'
since 1967 has created a control S\'stem, leading
to systematic human rights yiolations by Israel in
the \Vest Bank and the Gaza Strip. To establish the
causal link between this dual value system and
systematic human rights abuses in the occupied
territories, I will describe the tripartite value s\'stem
upon which Zionists founded Israel. Then I will
explain hmv Israel's occupation of the \X'est Bank
and Gaza in 1967 challenged this tripartite Yalue
s\'stem, which in turn led to the development of
the dual yalue system. Finally, I will outline the
process by which the Israeli polit\' entrenched
these dual values in control techniques responsible
for extensive abuses of Palestinians' human rights
in the occupied territories since 1967.;
TilE PRF-I96 7 TRlmRTITF V,\U'F SYSTEI\!

Zionist leaders had three goals in mind when
they created the state of Israel in 1948: to create a
democratic state, to form a Jewish state, and to
establish a state in the ancestral Land of Israel
(which, they envisioned, would extend roughly
from the l\lediterranean Sea to the Jordan Riyer).'
_1 Democratic Slale. Peter Meckling calls democracy "a set of normative ideals and a pattern of
rule. Central to it are such key values as liberty
and equality, which are simultaneously ends in
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themseh-es and means for attaining government b\'
the people in the sense of responsiveness to popular preferences."~ The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel (1\\a\' 14, 1(48),' the
premier document in Israel's legal code, dearh'
envisions this set of ideals and pattern of rule for
the citizens of its tledgling state:
The state of Israel will be based on freedom,
justice and peace as envisaged Iw the prophets
of Israel; it will ensure complete equalit\- of
social and political rights to all its inhabitants
irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will
guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education, and culture; it will safeguard
the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be
faithful to the principles of the Charter of the
United ;\lations.The aim of creating a democratic state dates
back to before Israel's founding. In 1942, the Extraordinary Zionist Conference adopted the Biltmore
Program, in which it reaftirmed its unequiwJCal
devotion to the cause of democratic freedom and
international justice to which the people of the
United States, allied with the other United ~ations,
have dedicated themselves and give expression to
their faith in the ultimate \'ictory of humanit\- and
justice over lawlessness and brute force.'
Instilling democratic ideals into its political
S\'stem was a primary goal of the new Israeli state,
Zionist leaders-and after 1948, Israelis themseh-es
-wanted a democratic state to preserve unfailinghthe freedom and equality that Jews had not
experienced for centuries.
,4 je1l'isJ) Sir/If. No less important to Israel's
Zionist founders was the establishment of a state
for Jews. Theodor Herzl, the father of the Zionist
movement, called for "the restoration of the
Jewish State" in his 1896 pamphlet Der jlldflls/atl/,
writing, "No one can den\' the gravity of the situ~
ation of the Jews. \Xiherever they live in perceptible numbers, they are more or less persecuted.'"
In the Declaration of the Establishment of the
State of Israel, Zionist leaders wrote that it is
"the natural right of the Jewish people to be
masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in
their own sovereign State."'" Nahum SokolO\\'
argued in 1919 that the principle of Zionism is "'a
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Homeland for the Jewish people," pointing out
that Je\vs "hm'e gro"'n tired of their role of a
homeless Chosen People, and would prefer to be a
self-supporting 'small nation,' with a quiet spot of
earth for themselves."" The need to establish a
Jewish state was indeed imperative to those who
founded IsraeL They knew, moreover, that without
making israel a haven for Jews, many of their
people would fear that another Holocaust could
occur in Palestine.
." 1 Sta!e ill !/Je .".JIICf.rtml Lalld The founders of
Israel also recognized the importance of establishing their state in the Land of Israel, or l:retz
i.rraei, extending from the I\Iediterranean Sea
to the Jordan River. Herzl recognized the centralit\,
of the land to the Jewish psyche: "Palestine is our
ever-memorable historic home. The very name of
Palestine would attract our people with a force
of man'elous potency."" The Declaration of the
Establishment of the State of Israel begins with
these words, which represent the special place that
Palestine holds in the Jewish heart:
Eretz-lsrael (the Land of Israel) was the
birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their
spiritual, religious and political identity was
shaped. Here the\' tlrst attained statehood,
created cultural values of national and universal
significance and gave to the world the eternal
Book of Books.';
Even after the founding of the state, one of
the principal aims of the \X'orld Zionist Organization was "the ingathering of the Jewish People
in its historic homeland, Eretz YisraeL"" Even
Herut, the long-time opposition party to mainstream Zionism, agreed, claiming that "the Hebrew
homeland, whose territory extends on both sides
of the Jordan, is a single historical and geographic
uniL"" Je\vish history dictated, according to all
segments of Jewry, that the Jewish homeland
should be in Palestine. SokolO\\l holds that "the
goal of [Zionist] efforts [was] to be united in an
organic community, to feel entirely at home," in all
aspects of their society-'" It is interesting to note,
moreover, that the declaration establishing Israel
did not delineate any borders for the new state.'Palestine was the birthplace of Judaism, and
Zionists felt it essential to build the Jewish home-

land there, but it was not certain at the beginning
how large the homeland would be.
The goal of the nascent state of Israel was
to be a Jewish democratic state nestled in the
ancestral homeland of the Jews. In reality, however,
although the state \vas Jewish and democratic, its
territory' comprised only about half of what
Zionists considered Eretz , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - IsraeL David Ben-Gurion
convinced his people to
be patient, telling them
that the time would come
when they could accomplish their final goal of
living in all of IsraeL"
After 1948, Israelis had
a Jewish democratic state,
but it wasn't until after the
Six-Day \'\'ar in 1967, when Israel gained control of
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, that Israelis
gained the opportunin' to live in all of Eretz IsraeL

For Israel, controlling
the territory was
highly desirable, yet
the inhabitants of the
terntones were highly
undesirable.

Acquiring all of the Land of Israel came with
a price. Once again, Israelis could still satisfy
only two of their three goals. Approximately one
million Palestinian Arabs were living in the newly
acquired territory of the \X'est Bank and Gaza,
forcing Israelis to face three options, none of
which satistled all the goals they had pursued in
originally establishing their state. First, they could
formally annex the new territory and remain a Jewish state. But that would mean curtailing Israeli
democracy by severely limiting the civil and human
rights of the indigenous Palestinian population.
Second, Israelis could formally annex the territories and keep their democracy. This would cost
the state its Jewish identity, since Arabs, given
demographic trends, would soon outnumber Jews.
I t would alter the state's Jewish character if
Palestinians enjoved full political participation.
Third, they could remain a democratic Jewish state.
However, that would mean either giving up the
territories or getting rid of the Palestinian population b\· mass transfer-something the international
community would not countenance-which meant,
essentially, that they would have to give up the West
Bank and Gaza.'"
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This dilemma asked Israelis to answer diftlcult
questions. "\\'ho were they? A nation of Jews Jiving
in all the land of Israel, but not democratic? A
democratic nation in all the land of Israel, but not
Jewish? Or a Jewish and democratic nation, but
not in all the land of Israel?"'" To the Labor g(Nernment of 1967, one thing was benmd debate: "Israel
must remain a state with a predominantly Jewish

democrac\' in which Israelis participated fulh' but
Palestinians did not.
The solution to this philosophical dilemma was
to ignore it altogether. The biographer of Israeli
statesman i\/enachem Begin pointed out that
"Begin did not acknowledge the existence of a
'Palestinian problem,"'" ;\ccording to one Israeli
sociologist, the Israeli polit\, felt that "the best
solution ,vould he for these people [palestinians

majority. [Those in the Labor part\'1 agreed that
annexation of the territories would eventually
threaten the Jewish character of the State of
Israel."" For Israel, controlling the territon' ,vas
highly desirable in order to define its character as

in the territoriesl to e\"aporate miraculoush'."'" "-\s
Thomas f<riedman describes it, it was as if Israelis
had taken a ride on the Nn\" York subway:

a Jewish state extending throughout Eretz Israel;
yet, for the same reason, the inhabitants of the terri-

Sometimes YOU get on the subway at Grand
Central Station and take the last seat in the car,

tories were highly llildesirable." Despite the jubilation of finall," acquiring all of Eretz Israel in 196 7 ,
Israelis still faced a very difficult dilemma: \X"hich of
their three goals were they willing to give up?

The train moves on to the next station and who

TilE DE\'EL()P.\IEJ'.:T ()F TilE Dt'.\L V,\UE SYSTEJ\I

Israel answered that it was not willing to give
up any of its three goals, This answer required a
psychological shift in the Israeli polity. If Israel
would not give up the land, and it would not give
up its democracy or its Jewishness, then Israelis
necessarily had to think of Palestinians as deserving fewer rights than Israelis. This made it
possible for Israel to make a de facto annexation of
the land, excluding the land's inhabitants from
political participation, while not

Violence against
Arabs often goes
unpunished
whereas violence 0;
Arabs is very
harshly dealt with
even before a trial.

actualh' making the territories
part of Israel. Thus, Israelis
could have a Jewish democrac,'
within the pre-l96 7 borders of
Israel and still extend their
statehood from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River. As
Y oram Peri describes it, "\'Vhile
the territ,ories are not yet an

integral part of the State of
Israel, neither are they external
to it."'; Israelis would not support a return to the

should get on but a little old lad" carrying t\\'O
hig grocery bags, What is the tlrst thing you do"
You take Fue j\'cJI' ) (Jrk Til//e.r '"OU are reading
and put it up in front of ~'our face, em"erini'
your eyes, because if your eye meets her e,'e,
you are going to have to give up your seat.'In order to aehie\"e all three of their collective
goab, Israelis had to il-,rnore that a problem existed
in offering fewer political rights to a Palestinian than
to an Israeli, \X"hat deYeioped, then, was a dual \~alue
system "characterized b,' totally different rules of
the game, cultures and institutional arrangements
applied in different spheres of actiyit\' for yarious
components of the control system.""
E\,IDEl\:CES OF TilE Dl',\L V,\JXI', SYSTFM

It did not take long for the dual value system to
appear in the occupied territories, Soon after the
1967 war, Menachem Begin "asserted that Israeli
law and jurisdiction must be extended to what he
called the liberated territories."'" Less than three
weeks after the war, the Knesset passed legislation
extending Israeli law to all territon' acquired in the
1967 war.;" Since 1948, however, the Knesset has

status quo ante bellum, as Prime Minister Levi
Eshkol iterated one week after the 1967 conflict:
"The position that existed until now shall never
again return."'! However, this entailed the creation

also declared that a state of emergency exists in
Israel, allowing the Israeli government to enforce
both military and civilian la,," in the terri ton" it
controls. In reality, Israel applies militan' law onh'
to Palestinians in the territories, for example, b,~
trying Palestinians in military courts and Israelis in
civilian courts, \I It applies civilian law inside Israel's

of a selective democracy in the Israeli psyche, a

pre-1967 borders, in East Jerusalem and the Golan

,
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Heights (Israel annexed those areas after the 1i.J()7
\,-ar), and in the occupied territories, but onh' in
cases involving Israelis," The Defense (Emergency)
Regulations are the basis for Israeli military law, and
even leading Jewish lmn'ers opposed the regulations when the British imposed them in 1945. One
of these law\'ers, Dr. Dov Yosef, commented at
that time:

Even Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem was
selective. "Although Israel's extension of jurisdiction
in 1967 was such as to give Israel full national authority in hast Jerusalem, it was selective enough to
avoid granting full citizenship rights to the Palestinian majority in East Jerusalem."" Specitlcally, the
Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem could
not vote in national Knesset , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,
elections,;" and the Israeli

Is the administration to be allO\ved

to interfere

in the lives of the people with no protection
for the individual? j\s it is, there is no guarantee
to prevent a citizen from being imprisoned for
life without trial. There is no protection for the
freedom of the individual: there is no appeal
against the decision of the military commander, no means of resorting to the Supreme
Court . . . while the administration has unrestricted freedom to banish am'. citizen at am'.
moment. \X'hat is more, a man does not actually
have to commit an offense; it is enough for a
decision to be made in some office for his fate
to be sealed."
Also, Israel tends to be more lenient on Jews
than on Palestinians. I n the 19HOs, "a member of
the Knesset suggested changing the criminal law so
that a Jew \\'ho kills an Arab for nationalist reasons
would not be prosecuted according to the existing criminal law, but dealt with preferentially.""
Though this suggestion never became law, lenienc\'
was the norm for soldiers who killed Palestinians
during the ilili/{/(/(/, the popular Palestinian uprising that began in late 19H7. In the first half of
the ilili/ada, the IDF killed six hundred Arabs using
live ammunition." Weak disciplinary procedures
and concern for morale tended "to exonerate the
security force even in the face of clear evidence of
over-reaction on their part."'"
Israel also treats Jewish settlers in the occupied
territories \vith lenience. According to one report,
'\-iolence aJ!,aifIJl Arabs often goes unpunished
whereas violence I)), Arabs is ver)' harshly dealt with
even before a trial. 1\S far as the settlers are concerned, the territories are alread\' part of Israelthe Arab population is largely excluded from the
resulting benefits.";- The rules of the game have
dictated preferential treatment for Israelis in the
occupied territories.

government issued them blue
identification cards to clistinguish them from their Jewish
counterparts, while dem'ing
them Israeli citizenship and
passports. ,,,

Israel's political system
developed a status quo
policy that ignored the
philosophical problems
inherent in a democratic state subjecting a
minority ethnic population to military rule.

i\[oreover,
Palestinian
workers in Israel do not enJOY the same rights as Israeli
workers. None are members of the national workers'
union, Histadrut, and their employers can dismiss
them ljuite easily. In addition, "the\, are us.ually paid
less than Jews in the same jobs; they do not get
many of the fringe benefits which their Jewish
colleagues enjm'; they do not get anything in return
for the national insurance and pension contributions automatically deducted from their wages
(if they are employed legally).""
Meir Vilner, a member of the Democratic
Front for Peace and Equality, an Israeli political
party, attacked the double standard that exists for
Arabs and Jews in Israel:

\'('hat is the "democratic character" [of the
State of Israelp In my yiew, even today this
democratic character is very limited .... There
is discrimination against the Arab population in
Israel, in . . . all domains of life. Lands are
stolen on racialist nationalist grounds. Is this
democracy? Arab students are expelled from
universities, Is this democracy?12
Israel has also rejected the Palestinians' right to
being a "people." \\inen the 1978 Camp David
Accords made reference to "the Palestinian people,"
Prime Minister i\Ienachem Begin held that "the
expressions 'Palestinians' or 'Palestinian people'
are being and will be construed and understood, ..
[by Israel] as 'Palestinian Arabs."'"' Israel is the state
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of the 'Jewish people," but it \vill not afford the
same communal rights to Palestinians.
E~TRF"'CIli\IEt-;T (ll TilE Dl'.\L V\U'f': SYSTHI

The nature of Israel's political S\'stem helps
explain why Israel, a democratic state, has
implemented seemingly racist policies. In Israel's
proportional representation system, there is a very
low threshold requirement for parties to gain seats
in the I'-nesset. This allows parties with a small
constituency to have disproportionate power in
government." This was especialh' evident after
1%7, when the Labor party began to lose its
intluence in Israeli politics. From 19411 to 1% 7,
J\1apai (and later Labor, its successor) dominated
Israeli politics, winning every election during that
period." There was little to challenge the unity of
the Israeli polit\"o That changed in 1967, however,
with the acquisition of the occupied territories. The
dilemma that Israelis faced allowed other groups
besides i\1apai to make their impression on the
scene, leading to political gridlock and an ambivalent
position towards the occupied
territories. !\io one, including
Labor, was willing to give up
the occupied territories. And
no one, especially Labor, was
willing to annex them outright.
Instead, Israel's political system
developed a status quo policy
that ignored the philosophical
problems inherent in a demo-

the motives of these three groups helps explain
why a democratic Israel pursued undemocratic
policies in the occupied territories.
Sephardic jelJ's. "In the case of contlict between
ethnic groups, the ruling group tends to emphasize
its primordial attributes, its ethnicity, as the central
basis for defining the national collective," writes
Yoram Peri."" In 1967, Israeli society absorbed

SIGMA

Rf/{l!.i(!IIJ 1\101'1'II/1'II1.r. Ultra-religious movements
were the second group benefiting from the results
of the 1% 7 war. To these religious groups, Eretz
Israel is sacred, and the liberation of Judea and
Samaria (i.e., the occupied territories) was the first
step in establishing the messianic theocracy. Consequently, any non-Jew living there had no right
to live there, and it is the duty of these religious
groups to settle as much of the land as possible,
preparatory to ushering in the messianic reign." B\·
intluencing the political system at strategic points
and benetiting from favorable public opinion, the
most prominent of these religious groups, Gush
Emunim ("Bloc of the Faithful," founded in
1( 7 4), \vas successful in injecting its ,"iews into
Israel's policies on the occupied territories.'" Israel's

political system allowed for the implementaion of
Gush norms to the extent that it helped entrench
the dual value system in Israel.
E,-en though Cush membership represented
onlY a fraction of Israel's population, broad public support
was essential to Gush Emumm's success. Polls show that,
after 1% 7, the Israeli public
was even more reticent than
the government to giye up the
territories. In 1 <)73, 74 percent
of Israelis were unwilling to
return any land to the Arabs
in return for peace, \vhich
coincides with Gush ideals. In 19711, half of the
Israeli public was still opposed to relinquishing
Istaeli control over the territories."" Indeed,
"without . . . the legitimacy it received from the
Israeli public Gush Emunim might have remained
a protest movement with no ability to transform its
ideology into a realistic enterprise.""
Gush Emunim and its allies in the ~ational
Religious Party (!\iRP) have also benefited from
the ambivalence of Labor government policies, an
ambivalence which has been the result of Israel's
political ,,·stem. From 1967 to 1977, when Labor
led the government, these religious acti,"ists would
simply establish a presence where they wanted a
settlement. Even though this was neither technically legal nor fully compliant \\lith the Labor

Settlements perpetuate and entrench
the double standard
of values governing
Israelis and
Palestinians.

cratic state subjecting a minority ethnic population to military rule.
Three segments of Israeli society had a
political interest in the entrenchment of this status
quo polin' and the dual value sYstem that went
along with it. These three groups were Sephardic
Jews, religious movements (especially Gush
Emunim), and political parties (especially Likud and
Labor, the two dominant parties). understanding

12·

about one million Arabs, effectiveh- creating a
bi-national state.'-
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party's policies, Labor officials would cave in,
providing militan' protection, sen·ices, and road
access> In fact, that is how the first settlement
began. On the e\'e of Passover-April 4, 19(1)two rabbis and a group of ()rthodox Jewish
families rented an Arab-cJ\\'ned hotel in Hebron,
the cit\· where (according to tradition) Abraham,
Isaac, and Jacob are buried. The,· had told Israeli
authorities that the,·. would rent the hotel onlY for
the \veek of Passover, but when the holiday was
m'er the\' vowed to never leave the land of the
Jewish Patriarchs." Thomas Friedman describes
the reaction of the government:

application. "Onll' two-thirds [agreed] that
minority-opinion groups should be allowed to
operate freely to gain majority support for their
positions." \X'hen the survey asked respondents to
applY it to their "least liked" group, such as Peace
Now or groups connected with the PLO, popular
support decreased from 1)3 to 38 percent." This
public uncertainty towards democratic principles
weakens incentives for political parties to form
clear policies on democracy in the occupied
territories.
It has been politically inexpedient for Israeli
political parties to develop policies that would lead
to either formal annexation of or complete withEventualh' the Labor-led government, torn by
drawal from the occupied territories. The Labormixed emotions, caved in to the settlers, allowGahal coalition gO\'ernment that ruled from 1%7
ing them to sta,' in a militan' camp in Hebron
to 197() considered the status quo "the least disruptive polin' to follow" because "the mainstream
and later to build a Jewish settlement there
of
public opinion supported" its continuation.
called l....:.in·at Arba.~'
"\X'ithin the government discussion focused more
These settlements perpetuate and entrench the
on transition arrangements within the territories
double standard of values governing Israelis and
than over their ultimate and final status."'" Defense
Palestinians. ()nce a settleMinister Moshe Dayan, an
ment's foundations are laid,
advocate of de facto but not
the\' arc nearly impossible to
formal annexation, took aduproot. Due to broad public
vantage of this opportunity
support and effective politito govern the territories as he
cal maneuvering, religious
saw fit by extending Israeli
mO\'ements have succeeded
la\v to East Jerusalem; allowin sewing dualist ideals into
ing the establishment of
the patchwork of Israeli
settlements; confiscating Arab
societ\·.
land; extending Israel's road
Po/itical PartieJ. A third
network, electric grid, and
group, political parties, stands L-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---" water system to the terri,

Public uncertainty
towards democratic
principles weakens
incentives for political
parties to form clear
policies on the
occupied territories.

at the heart of the political indecisiveness surrounding Israel's policies towards the occupied
territories. This indecisiveness has led, in practice,
to status quo policies that extend Israeli control
O\'er the land but do not extend Israeli democracy
to the land's inhabitants and has ensured the
perpetuation of dualist policies in the occupied
territories as long as the indecision persists.
A 1985 stud\' revealed the public's role in this
indecisiveness. "The belief in majority rule, in
freedom of expression, in the right of the citizen
to criticize the government, and in equality before
the law" received the support of between 80 and
9() percent of the respondents. However, there was
a gap between the abstract norm and its practical

tories; creating investment incentives for Jewish
entrepreneurs in the territories (but not for
Palestinian ones); and freezing the demographic make-up of the territories by not allowing the return of refugees who had fled during
the war. sThe ambivalence of Israel towards the
occupied territories continued after 1970, as did its
continued implementation of dualist policies. The
period from 1970 to 1973 was one of "standstill
diplomacy," according to William Quandt. Gahal,
the part\' of Menachem Begin, left the broad
I,abor-Gahal coalition. This made the Labor
government even less willing to confront and
oppose the actions of Gush Emunim settlers and
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the policies of Defense Minister Dm'an in the
territories. \X'ith the psychological loss of the 197.)
war, the Labor government changed its leadership,
appointing Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin, and Yigal
Allon, who were far from unified on their policies
towards the territories. This made it even harder to
exert signitlcant pressure on militant groups
like Gush Emunim.
This, coupled with renewed opposition from
the Likud party and
Gush Emunim, further
weakened Labor's hold
on the Israeli political
system and further
ingrained its indecisiveness on the occupied
territories. "
In 1977, when
Likud unexpectedly defeated Labor, the status of
the occupied territories had still not become
significant in the eyes of the Israeli polity. Likud
was "dedicated to the integration of the historic
Land of Israel."'·' The new Likud government
worked with Gush Emunim to maximize Israel's
de facto control over the territories. In fact, the
Likud's settlement patterns "were meant to
establish facts which would make it diftlcult for any
government to withdraw from the West Bank."""
This change in direction was possible because the
election mandate did not proscribe it.
The public's ambivalence prompted Likud to
institutionalize its policies in November 1981 with
Military Order 949, which called for a "civil"
administration in the occupied territories. The plan
also called for more Palestinian participation in
local affairs, but the "civilian" administrator was
actually a reserve army officer who replaced
incompliant Palestinian municipal councils with
Israeli army officers. These' new Likud policies led
to censorship of pro-PLO newspapers; increased
expulsions, home demolitions, and curfews; seizures of property; and imprisonments without trial.
The new civil administration also closed Bethlehem, an-Najah, Hebron, and Bir Zeit universities
"for weeks or months at a time."(,[
That Likud policies became entrenched is clear
from the principles adopted by the 1984 National

New Likud policies led to
censorship of pro- PLO
newspapers; increased
expulsions, home
demolitions, and curfews;
seizures of property;
and imprisonments
without trial.
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Unit\' Government, a Labor-Likud coalition. The
agreement "guaranteed inaction on the issue that
was most crucial, the future of the \\'est Bank and
Gaza, \vhere the status quo \vas to be maintained:
no annexation and no change in sovereignty,"'"
t.Ioreover, the settlement program was to continue,
and the new government even "thickened" existing
settlements to allow the Jewish population of the
territories to continue growing.";
The principles of the 1984 National l' nit\
Government show the ambiguity of the Israeli
political system-and of Israeli political partiestowards the occupied territories, This ambiguity
resulted from the position of Sephardic .Je\\'s, the
actions of religious groups like Gush Emunim,
and the uncertainty of the Israeli public towards
democratic principles. All this, in turn, contributed
to the entrenchment of the dual value system in
Israel's policies towards the occupied territories.
TilE IsR,\ELI C()t\TR()L SYSTFJ\I

The natural result of the dual \'alue s,'stem's
injection into Israel's policies is a control system that
infringes on the rights of the Palestinian population
in the occupied territories. Baruch Kimmerling defines a "control sl'stem"
as a territorial entity compnsl11g several subcollectivities, held together lw purelY militan'
and police forces and their civil extensions (e.g.,
bureaucracies and settlers). \\'hen the "tleld
of power" is much larger than the "field of
authority," a control S\'stem is formed. These
subcollectivities are stratified according to their
abilit\' to gain access to force, political power
and diverse rights, but mostly according to the
shared benetlts of the entire s\'stem. Am'
situation of armed occupation (but no more
than that) is a temporan' control system. The
central component differentiating between
situations such as internal colonialism, deeph'
divided societies, the Soviet "satellite" sYStem,
slave-based societies, etc., and the control
system is the ruling sector's virtually total lack
of interest and ability in creating a common
identit\' or basic value system to legitimize its
use of violence to maintain the system, or in
developing other kinds of loyalties toward
force and power.'"
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The purpose of the control S\'stem is to either
keep Palestinians down or to drive them out,
with the ultimate goal of preventing them from
challenging Israel for control of the land. The
Israeli control system does this by making the
economy of the occupied territories dependent
upon that of Israel,''' b\' using force to quell
Palestinian resistance to the occupation, and by
making li\'ing conditions unbearable to Palestinians. As ;\Iexander Flores points out, "an often
voiced suspicion is that Ithese restrictions I are
geared to make life unbearable for the Palestinian
inhabitants and to make as many of them emigrate
as possible."""
In Israel, the control S\'stem has tlowed from
the existence of the dual value S\'stem, but only in
conjunction with the Israeli political system. The
Israeli polity has demonstrated its willingness to
allow for a double standard in dealing with
Palestinians, despite Israel's ideals of democracy
and the desire of the Israeli polin' to achieve all
three of its national goals. This is how the dual
\'alue S\'stem that developed in Israel after 1967
resulted in the control S\'stem. In its turn, this
control S\'stem has resulted in s}'stematic human
rights abuses because the entrenchment of the
dual value s\'stem turned discriminatory ideas into
discriminaton' action.
These sntematic abuses include Israel's
"Judaization" polin' in Jerusalem, the settlement
program, administrative methods of control, and
Israel's response to the illtijtlda. Israeli actions vis-avis the Palestinians demonstrate how the extension
of the tield of power beyond the tield of authorit\,
-i.e., the implementation of the dual value
system-has led to S\'stematic human rights abuses
in the \\'est Bank and Gaza Strip since 1967.
TI.If.l"daizatio/l 0l.Jemsa!elll. Israel's policy in East
Jerusalem is to encourage Palestinians to leave,
while establishing a Jewish majority there. This
discriminatory polin' was evident from the beginning of Israel's occupation of East Jerusalem.
After the 1967 war, the Israeli government
"[expanded] the municipal boundaries of the
city to include as much land as possible and to
exclude as much of the Palestinian population as
possible."'·- Israel also extended "full Israeli law and
administration" to East Jerusalem, though it did not
offer the area's Palestinian inhabitants citizenship

or passports:" Today, the dual value S\'stem has
become fused with the control system in Israel's
Jerusalem policies. Anat Hoffman, a member of
the Jerusalem City Council, wrote in 1995:
Continuing discrimination against Arabs IS
ingrained in Jerusalem's political culture, a sort
of accepted blemish we are trained to see and
overlook. It characterizes the workings of this
city in ever}' walk of life, ranging from the
macro to the minute. !\Iv tile cabinets are
literally overtlowing with examples in every
sphere: emplovment, economics, taxation,
housing, construction, education, cit\' planning, welfare, health, roads, buses, sewerage,
street lights.""
Israel's attempt to Judaize Jerusalem is clear.
For instance, Palestinians own 85 to 90 percent of
land in East Jerusalem, though only a fraction
of this land is zoned for residential building.-" Of
the 7S,OOO dunums annexed to Jerusalem in 1967,
Israel has expropriated 2S,000 to build new Jewish
neighborhoods.- ' The Israeli government has only
designated 7,SO() dunums of Arab land as residential. Also, from 1967 to
1994, the Jewish population
of East Jerusalem grew by
204,2UO, while the Arab
population grew bv 96,300.
However, 64,800 new housing units were built for
Jews (or one unit for every
3.15 Jewish residents) and
8,800 for Arabs (or one
unit for every 10.9 Arab
inhabitants). In East Jerusalem, 87.5 percent of
Jewish settlers "live in
housing conditions of one
or fewer persons per room,
whereas only 33.4 percent of the Arabs live in such
conditions." The object of providing more
housing for Jews than for Arabs in East Jerusalem
is to make the Palestinians feel crowded enough
to leave the city altogether, making way for the
further Judaization of Jerusalem.- 2
T/.if Jettie1JJeI!t Prqrz,Tam. The purpose of Israel's
settlement policy has been to prevent the

The object of providing
more housing for Jews
than Arabs in East
Jerusalem is to make the
Palestinians feel crowded
enough to leave the city
altogether, making way
for the further Judaizacion of Jerusalem.
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Palestinian population from challenging Israel for
control of the occupied territories. \X'ith its settlement program, Israel has gained exclusive control
over more than 6() percent of the \Vest Bank and
40 percent of the Gaza Strip." The discriminatory
nature of the settlements is obvious, but especially
so in Gaza, where 3,500 settlers in 16 settlements
occupy 5,56() acres of land, while 300,O()() Palestinian refugees in eight camps live on 1,375 acres.-'
The distribution of water in the occupied
territories is also discriminator\". Settlers use three
times as much water per head as do Arabs in the
\X'est Bank (thirteen times as much when it comes
to agriculture), and Israel has frozen Palestinians'
water consumption, though it has placed no such
restrictions on settlers.-'
J\1oreover, Israel has expropriated l\rab-owned
land on a large scale in order to support settlements. In Ma\' 1997 alone, the government contlscated 7,OOU acres of Palestinian land in order to
expand both settlements and the by-pass roads
leading to them.-' Expropriating land also deprives
Palestinians of their agricultural livelihoods, further depressing the economy of the occupied territories and making Palestinians' living conditions
less desirable.-"
Adlllini.r/ratilJf i\1etbodr of Control. Israeli control
methods have also resulted in circumstances that
worsen Palestinians' standard of living and keep
them economically and politically unable to challenge Israel's control (wer the occupied territories.
Israel forbids Palestinian workers from staying
overnight in Israel and issues "work permits to
control the flow of labour," further emphasizing
the separate political and economic status of
Palestinians from the territories.-- In an effort to
solidify Israel's de facto control over the territories,
Israeli oftlcials have set frequent curfews, seized
property, imprisoned Palestinians without trial, sent
workers home without pay, jammed Palestinian
radio broadcasts, and sealed the borders of the
territories so workers could not get to work.-~ The
IDF has also "detained thousands of suspects
without charge or trial. ... The detainees, however,
[have] had no right to learn the reasons for
the government's suspicion, but [have borne] the
burden of disproving them to gain release."-"
I.rrae/:r Respome to the Intifada. The in/ijclria was
the general Palestinian uprising against Israel's
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occupation of the occupied territories that lasted
from late 19R7 to 1993. I srae]'s response to the
in/ijilda involved some of the most obvious cases of
human rights abuses since the occupation of the
\Vest Bank and Gaza in 1%7.
In 1987, Israel became the tlrst lT~ memberstate to officially sanction torture b\' limiting
torture to "a moderate amount of force" and
"non-violent ps\'chological pressure." HO\\'ever, "a
handful of prisoners have subsequently died under
interrogation."'" During the ill/ijilda, "commonh'
used torture techniques included beatings, electrical shock, keeping a tight-fitting hood over a person's head for long periods, sleep depri,-ation, and
tying a person's hands to a bar behind the person's
back, making standing impossible.""
On .lanuan 19, 1988, Defense J\[inister Yitzhak
Rabin announced a policy of "might, power, and
beatings" to counter the Palestinian uprising." After
the announcement of this polin°, "hundreds of
Palestinians were 'methodicall\" beaten, man\" with
the bones of their hands and arms broken.""
Minority Rights Group International reports, "B,'
the end of 1991, O\-er 1,000 Palestinians had been
killed by shootings, beatings, tear gas or some other
means. Over a quarter of those who died were
under 16. Another lOO,(J()(J suffered serious injuries,
while over 15,O()() were held without trial for at least
six months.""
All of the control methods that Israel employed to counter the illtijclda were in addition to
those already in place for controlling the occupied
territories. After mid-1992, when the illti/ada was
already in decline, cases of s\-stematic torture,
interrogation, and beatings decreased in both
number and intensity." However, this reduction
was due to the effectiveness of alt-ead\' existing
control methods (such as economic repreSSIOn,
administrative methods of control, and home
demolitions) and the weakening of Palestinian
resistance to the military occupation.
The purpose of the control s\'Stem is to
maintain a de facto annexation of the occupied
territories while not actualh- making them officiall\'
part of Israel. To do this, the control s\"Stem uses
the methods of control I have outlined to keep
Palestinians in the territories economicalh- and
politically depressed and to encourage them to
emigrate from the land. Though the methods
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change over time, the purpose and underlying
design of the control ,\'stem femain essentialk
unchanged. During times of stiff popular resistance, as during the illtij{Ida, Israel employs stiff
methods of control, such as severe beatings, school
closings, and arcane torture methods. \X'hen the
indigenous population is more docile, it is not
necessaf\' for the Israeli occupiers to be overtly
coercive, and they emplO\' more subtle means of
control, such as home demolitions, roadblocks,
and the manipulation of building licenses. In both
cases, the purpose of the control system is the
same: keep Palestinians down or out in order to
perpetuate lsraeli control over the \X'est Bank and
Gaza Strip.

Human rights abuses in the \Vest Bank and
Gaza have occurred as a result of the entrenchment of a dual value system in Israel's
control structure. Therefore, Israel has two options
if it wants to end-Of signitlcanth' diminish, in am'
event-its human rights abuses in the occupied
territories.
The first choice is for Israel to maintain its dual
value s\'stem but eliminate its control system. In
other words, Israel would withdraw from the
territories, because the control sYstem depends on
a field of power that is larger than the field of
authority, which IS inherent in any military
occupation. This option would not require Israel
to modify its double standard with respect to
Palestinians, even though-over time-this ma\'
be the result. At the same time, this option would
require Israel to modify its national goals somewhat, for it could not be a state extending across all
of Eretz Israel if it withdrew from the West Bank
and Gaza, though it could still maintain a democracy within its new borders, as well as its
Je,vishness.
The second choice for Israel is to eliminate the
dual value s\'stem altogether, b~' which it would
offer equal political rights to Palestinians in the
occupied territories. However, Israel would thus
risk losing its Jewish identity, and it still might not
have de facto control over all the Land of IsraeL
Even so, it would effectively eliminate human
rights violations by raising Palestinians to the same
civil and political level that Israeli Jews enjoy. The

Law of Return (1950) grants all Jews, no matter
where the\' live in the world, the right to Israeli
citizenship. In late 1999, the Knesset debated a bill
that would declare the Law of Return discriminatory, because it does not offer non-Jews the same
right. Zehava Gal-on, a member of the Knesset
from the leftist Meretz Part\', said during the
debate, "The Law of Return is discriminatory. It
discriminates between Jews and non-Jews. I can
accept that after the Holocaust, it was kind of a
necessity. But maybe after 51 years, we are not in
the same situation, and we don't need to run our
countf\' based on such undemocratic laws.'"'' At
the same time, Prime Minister Ehud Barak vowed
to ne\'er discuss the law-much less amend itduring his term, which makes it unlikely that Israel
will officially modif\, its dual value S\'stem any time
soon.'- The fact that a Jewish MI"';: would even
challenge the law, though, is a step towards
eliminating the double standard between Jews and
Palestinians.
\X'ith either option, Israel must compromise on
its national goals. Thus, the dilemma that Israelis
have faced since 1967 remains unchanged. Who
are the\', and which of their national goals are they
willing to give up?
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